Kansas District Court Rejects Federal Court Intervention in Foreclosure Case
By Blair Gisi, Esq.
USFN Member (IA, KS, MO, NE)
While the mortgage default industry as a whole may be focused on Flowers[1] and its potential impact on FinCEN reporting, Kansas has its own Flowers concerns. In Flowers v. Dupree, No. 26-2501-KHV (D. Kan. 2026), the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas rejected an attempt to use federal court proceedings to prevent a foreclosure sale pending in state court.
A foreclosure action was initiated against the Flowers in December 2024. AmeriHome Mortgage Company, LLC v. Richard Flowers, et al., Wyandotte County District Court Case No. WY-2024-CV-000883 (KSD ECF). Following a lengthy, heavily litigated, and ongoing history, a sheriff’s sale was scheduled for September 22, 2026. In another effort to delay the foreclosure, the Flowers filed a complaint on August 20, 2026, against all parties involved in the foreclosure action, including the state court judge. They also filed “Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction to Stay Foreclosure Sale.”
In their motion, the Flowers alleged that, while attempting to file their “emergency” pleadings at the Wyandotte County courthouse, their interactions with court clerks became so hostile that sheriff’s deputies had to be summoned. They argued that these events evidenced a “pattern of corruption” and constituted an ongoing violation of their due-process rights. The Flowers also argued that they had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on their claims under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA).
The federal court relied on the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The Act generally provides that a federal court “may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgment.” The court concluded that none of the Act’s three exceptions applied under the circumstances presented. Those exceptions are discussed in greater detail in Atl. Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 286–87 (1970).
The Flowers’ reliance on RESPA did not change the result. Even if their RESPA arguments were plausible, the court explained that RESPA “is not an expressly authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.” Flowers, at 4. The three exceptions remain the bright-line test as to whether the court has jurisdiction.
The court further indicated that, even if the Anti-Injunction Act did not preclude the requested relief, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine presented an additional obstacle. Rooker-Feldman generally prevents federal district courts from exercising appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments. In other words, a state court litigant cannot use a federal district court as a vehicle to effectively appeal, modify, or nullify an adverse state court judgment.
Here, the foreclosing plaintiff had obtained a valid and enforceable state court judgment. The federal court, therefore, could not be used to review or alter the state court’s orders. See Millard v. Camper, 971 F.3d 1174, 1186 (10th Cir. 2020).
This opinion was short reprieve for the lender, however, as the saga did not end there. The Flowers subsequently filed another bankruptcy proceeding in further effort to delay the sale. Nevertheless, the Flowers decision provides a potentially useful tool for foreclosure practitioners confronting attempts to invoke federal court jurisdiction to interfere with ongoing state court foreclosure proceedings.
This decision is a reminder that a litigant’s attempt to recast state court foreclosure disputes as federal claims does not necessarily provide a path around the state court process. The Anti-Injunction Act—and, where applicable, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine—may provide significant barriers to efforts to obtain federal injunctive relief against a state-court foreclosure proceeding.