Unsettled in Kansas: Supreme Court Clarifies Timing for Void Judgment Challenges

By Blair Gisi, Esq.
SouthLaw, PC*
USFN Member (IA, KS, MO, NE)

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton, 223 L. Ed. 2d 438, may provide clarity in an area that has long divided federal courts: whether a party seeking relief from a void judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 must file its motion within a “reasonable time.”

The dispute arose from a 2014 Chapter 11 bankruptcy filed by Vista-Pro Automotives and a related adversary proceeding against Coney Island Auto Parts seeking roughly $50,000 in unpaid invoices. A default judgment was ultimately entered against Coney Island, although questions remained about whether service had been properly effected under the governing rules.

In 2016, the Chapter 11 case was converted to Chapter 7, and the trustee demanded payment from Coney Island based on the previously entered default judgment. This demand appears to have been the first confirmed notice Coney Island had of the judgment.

Despite that notice, Coney Island did not seek relief until 2021—five years later—when federal marshals attempted to seize the $50,000 pursuant to the judgment.

In its motion for relief, Coney Island argued the judgment was void because it had never been properly served. According to the company, the court therefore lacked personal jurisdiction, rendering the judgment void. Because a void judgment cannot be validated by the passage of time, Coney Island contended the one-year limitation for certain Rule 60 motions should not apply.

The bankruptcy court rejected that argument, concluding that the delay between Coney Island’s actual notice of the judgment in 2016 and its motion for relief in 2021 was unreasonable. The United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit affirmed, holding that motions under Rule 60(b)(4) must still be brought within a reasonable time. The appellate decision included a dissent arguing that courts lack authority to enforce void judgments.

Writing for the Court, Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. emphasized that Rule 60’s timing requirement applies to all motions brought under Rule 60(b), including those seeking relief from a void judgment: 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 permits a court to ‘relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding,’ and subdivision (b)(4) specifically authorizes relief from a ‘void’ judgment. … Rule 60(c)(1) provides that a ‘motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time.’ Because a motion for relief from an allegedly void judgment is a motion under Rule 60(b), the reasonable-time limit applies. Coney Island, at 442–43.

The Court did not define what constitutes a “reasonable time.” That omission may stem from the posture of the case: Coney Island did not argue that its motion was timely under the circumstances, but rather that no time limitation should apply at all.

Potential Divergence in Kansas
While the decision may clarify federal practice in some jurisdictions, Kansas courts may take a different approach as it relates to its own statute, K.S.A. §60-260. In the recent decision in MidFirst Bank v. Sipple, 2026 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 110, the Kansas Court of Appeals acknowledged Coney Island but began its analysis by stating: “First, our Kansas caselaw establishes that a ‘reasonable time’ for challenging a void judgment is any time.”

Ultimately, however, the court determined that the defendants’ arguments failed on the merits, making further analysis of the timing issue unnecessary. As a result, the broader implications of the Supreme Court’s ruling for Kansas law remain unsettled.

The Sipple case involved pro se litigants who had repeatedly challenged rulings throughout a foreclosure proceeding dating back to 2022. Given the procedural posture and the nature of the appellants’ arguments, the court appeared to have little need to fully address how Coney Island might affect Kansas precedent.

Looking Ahead
Whether Kansas and other jurisdictions ultimately align with the Supreme Court’s interpretation remains to be seen. The Coney Island decision could become a useful tool in cases involving long-delayed challenges to judgments, particularly in litigation involving pro se parties.

At the same time, the ruling may raise practical concerns in contexts such as junior lien disputes, tax foreclosures, and post-sale title issues where challenges to underlying judgments may surface years later.

For now, the decision underscores the importance of identifying potential service or jurisdictional defects early and consulting local counsel to evaluate the evolving impact of the Supreme Court’s ruling as what is “reasonable” will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

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